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Terrorism and National Liberation Movements:
Can Rights Derive from Wrongs?
.by Robert A. Friedlander*
"One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." This much
used and far too greatly abused aphorism well illustrates the dilemma
produced by militant self-determination proponents. Their credo is that
the end justifies the means. Their methodology postulates not only insur-
gency disguised as guerrilla warfare, but also the use of bomb and bullet
directed against civilian populations and innocent third parties through
acts of political violence often described as national and international ter-
rorism. On numerous occasions during recent decades the end result has
been the downfall of existing regimes and the establishment of new na-
tional entities. Small wonder that one senior American official directly
concerned with the subject has bluntly observed: "terrorism works."'
According to Frantz Fanon, the bitter political philosopher of the Al-
gerian independence movement "[niational liberation, national renais-
sance, the restoration of nationhood to the people. . . is always a violent
phenomenon." The issue, simply put, is whether terror-violence utilized
as a political weapon, wherever or whenever a dissident group is unable to
achieve its separatist objectives by any legitimized means, is permissible
within the framework of international law. Does a recognized normative
right of rebellion or revolution allow the use of either random or calcu-
lated violence directed against innocent third parties as a generally sanc-
tioned method of internal conflict? What exactly are the bounds of irreg-
ular warfare and to whom do they apply? Should terrorist actors, when
* Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University; Program Director (Law and Terrorism),
International Analysis Center, Inc.; B.A. Northwestern University, 1955; Ph.D. Northwest-
ern University, 1963; J.D. DePaul University, 1973.
Remarks of Ambassador Anthony C.E. Quainton, Director, Office for Combatting Ter-
rorism, U.S. Department of State; Program on International Terrorism, University of Akron,
Center for Peace Studies, Oct. 18, 1979.
2 F. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 35 (C. Farrington trans. 1963). Marxist phi-
losopher Jean Paul Sartre adds: "Once begun, it is a war that gives no quarter." Id. at 22.
For a penetrating critique of Sartre's views and those of Fanon, see R. ARON, HISTORY AND
THE DIALECTIC OF VIOLENCE 185-93 (B. Cooper trans. 1975).
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claiming involvement with the self-determinative process, be immune
from criminal liability? Must self-determination always be considered a
license to kill?
Despite the claims of radical ideologues, revisionist historians, and
leftist legalists, violence is not automatically a form of public protest
when directed against particular political systems and established govern-
ments. When victims comprise civilian populations, murder is murder, re-
gardless of what slogans are piously shouted or what justifications are in-
genuously conceived. Who determines those who are to suffer and those
who are to survive? Do victimizers have a better claim of right over their
helpless victims? What of the majority of the human race who, to borrow
a phrase from Nobel Laureate Albert Camus, "want to be neither victims
nor executioners?" s
The need to draw a distinction between the use of violence as a first
resort and the use of violence as a last resort has itself become so obfus-
cated by the world community that national liberation struggles have
often provided moral or legal justification for terrorist acts. Despite the
fact that they have co-opted the terminology of "guerrilla", not all ter-
rorists are guerrillas. Even more true is the obverse. As journalist Lesley
Hazeleton has recently written, confusion between the words guerrilla
and terrorist represents an "abrogation of the responsibility to distin-
guish between what is justifiable warfare and what is abhorrent under any
circumstances .. ."4 Terrorism is distinguished from guerrillaism by its
attacks upon the innocent and the separation of its victims from the ulti-
mate target. General Geroge Grivas, founder and head of the Cypriot
EOKA, which the British termed a terrorist organization, proudly as-
serted in his memoirs: "We did not strike, like the bomber, at random.
We shot only British servicemen who would have killed us if they could
have fired first, and civilians who were traitors or intelligence agents." 5
The French Resistance, the Polish Underground, and the Greek Guerril-
las were called terrorists by the Nazi Occupation, but they attacked only
military personnel, government officials, and local collaborators. Yet, the
present day terrorist-liberationist appears to follow the credo that those
who are not with us are against us. Violence not only provides the means
to a greater end, but it has become an end in itself.
A distinguished British legal scholar, Daniel Patrick O'Connell,
maintained nearly a decade ago that "'wars of national liberation' are
unknown to the law, and the concept is political."' He was referring, of
I A. CAMUS, NEITHER VICTIMS NOR EXECUTIONERS 27 (D. MacDonald trans. 1972).
4 Hazelton, Respectable Terrorism, HARPER'S, Oct. 1980, at 29.
Quoted by R. TABER, THE WAR OF THE FLEA: A STUDY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE THEORY
AND PRACTICE 106 (1977).
6O'Connell, Observations, 55 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 589
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course, to traditional international norms. Nevertheless, during the
1970's, the world community attempted to legitimate liberationist move-
ments in almost any context. On December 14, 1974, the United Nations
adopted by consensus a Definition of Aggression which specifically excul-
pates terrorist activity when terrorism is waged on behalf of self-determi-
nation movements or directed against colonial and racist regimes.7 Proto-
col II of the 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
while it exempts from application such categories as riots, internal distur-
bances, and isolated or sporadic "acts of violence," it particularly prohib-
its torture, the taking of hostages, and acts of terrorism (undefined), plus
any threats to perpetuate the aforesaid activities.8 Yet, Protocol I, Article
1, Section 4, removes from coverage "armed conflicts in which people are
fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against ra-
cist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination . . .
The obvious contradiction between the two Protocols has not been
resolved, nor has there been any attempt at further clarification. The net
effect of legitimizing terror by the Definition of Aggression and the Proto-
cols Additional has been to encourage third-party intervention on behalf
of national liberation movements and effectively to condone terror-vio-
lence whenever committed on their behalf. Small wonder that the famed
legalist Georg Schwarzenberger predicted almost ten years ago that these
"reforms" would constitute new milestones "on the high road to violence
unlimited."1 O
The Final Act of the much maligned Helsinki Declaration of August
1, 1975, labeled as a "constitutive/organic" source of international law by
a recently published American casebook, pledges the 35 signatory states
to "refrain from direct or indirect assistance to terrorist activities
(1973).
7 See Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.30a) 142,
U.N. Doc. A/9030/Add. 1 (1974). For contrasting views of the significance of the Definition,
cf. B. FERENCZ, DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION: THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE,
(1975); J. STONE, CONFLICT THROUGH CONSENSUS: UNITED NATIONS APPROACHES TO AGGRES-
SION (1977); J. STONE, AGGRESSION AND WORLD ORDER: A CRITIQUE OF UNITED NATIONS THE-
ORIES OF AGGRESSION (1958); A.V. THOMAS & A.J. THOMAS, JR., THE CONCEPT OF AGGRESSION
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1972).
8 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1442 (1977).
9 Id. at 1397. Cf. also Bassiouni, Repression of Breaches of the Geneva Convention
under the Draft Additional Protocol to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949, 8 RUT.-
CAM. L.J. 185 (1977); Dinstein, The New Geneva Protocols: A Step Forward or Backward?,
[1979] Y. B. WORLD AFF. 265; Bierzanek, Towards More Respect for Human Rights in
Armed Conflicts, 1 STUD. INT'L RELS. 75 (Polish Institute of International Affairs 1973). The
latter puts forward the Communist bloc view favoring softening of restrictions upon national
liberation movements.
10 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORDER 236 (1971).
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... ,I Nonetheless, the U.S.S.R. and several members of the Soviet
Bloc have consistently supported and. supplied several terrorist organiza-
tions, such as the P.L.O., with training, weapons, material, and financing,
despite the obligations imposed upon them by the Helsinki Convention.
Not only are these proscribed activities directly contra to the established
precept of pacta sunt servanda, incorporated into Article 26 of the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969),' and into Article 43 of
that same document (obligations imposed by international law indepen-
dently of a treaty),1 3 but the continued violation of their pledged agree-
ments by the non-performing states parties does not absolve them from
the norms of state responsibility. It does, however, cast serious doubt
upon the efficacy of the controlling document, particularly for those pro-
ponents who would grant to the agreement a "constitutive/organic" sta-
tus. The de facto recognition of the P.L.O. by the member nations of the
European Community, makes anomalous at best, their own claims of
right as related to their joint and several counter-terrorist activities."
Undoubtedly, the most extreme statement of support by the world
community for national liberation movements can be found in Resolution
3103 passed by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1973.
Entitled "Basic Principles of the Legal Status of Combatants Struggling
Against Colonial and Alien Domination and Racist Regimes,"15 Resolu-
tion 3103 provides to these insurrections and rebellions the color of legiti-
macy under international law. It assertively proclaims that "armed con-
flicts involving the struggle of peoples against colonial and racist regimes
are to be regarded as international armed conflicts . . .," but that "[t]he
use of mercenaries by colonial and racist regimes against the national lib-
eration movements struggling for freedom and independence from the
yoke of colonialism and alien domination is considered to be a criminal
act and the mercenaries should accordingly be punished as criminals."1
According to the formula posited by this hyperbolic rhetoric, the
Mauritanians who aided the Moroccans against the Polisaro Front were
" Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975.
14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1293, 1295 (1975).
I' Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, entered into force Jan. 7, 1980, art. 26,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679 (1969).
" Id. at art. 43.
14 The 21 nation Council of Europe urged recognition of Palestinian "legitimate rights"
in April 1980, and this was followed by a unanimous declaration of the nine EEC Heads of
State in June of the same year. See The Miami Herald, April 23, 1980, at 16-A, col. 1; N.Y.
Times, June 14, 1980, at cols. 1-2.
"I G.A. Res. 3103 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) 142, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprinted
in 1 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL CONTROL 495
(1979).
" Id. at 496.
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mercenaries, but the Cubans who fought for (and against) the Angolans
were legitimate combatants engaged in permissible military intervention.
In this type of situation, as a result of misunderstanding, misapplication,
and misdirection, the self-determinative principle has been less conflict
resolving than it has been conflict promoting.
Several years ago Professor Nicholas N. Kittrie conceded that,
"[t]aking notice of rising new angry minorities (ethnic, religious, linguistic
and cultural), and considering evidence of re-tribalisation in the modern
nation-State, dire predictions might be advanced of yet new waves of vio-
lence. '1 7 Economist Carl Landauer has called self-determination "an his-
torical necessity,"1 8 but challenges those who maintain that it is an un-
conditional right. This mini-analysis is based on firm legal and historical
grounds, although one certainly cannot deny that self-determination has
been a potent political force throughout most of the 20th century. In the
words of Professor Louis Sohn, self-determination is "an idea that revolu-
tionized the world.""9 But it was distorted in the post-Charter era to the
point where it now appears to be applied exclusively as an anti-colonial
weapon. What has been lacking with respect to international law, and
with reference to modem state practice, is a precise, definite, definable
standard which can be fairly and rationally implemented under indentifi-
able and equitable procedures.
In the context of world public order, during the past seven decades,
self-determination claims have been put forward as both a legal and
moral rationale for: (1) a right to internal revolution; (2) ground for se-
ceding from a dominant political entity; (3) a foundation for the unifica-
tion of peoples; (4) a basis for the choice of state affiliation; (5) establish-
ing minority rights; (6) a means for the acquisition of territory; and (7)
recognition per se as a human right. In our own era, self-determination
has become a code word for independence. The fundamental issue centers
on the nature of secession and revolution, and whether a means of legiti-
mizing the revolutionary process within the broader parameters of na-
tional aspirations and international law can be ascertained without
resorting to violence. The historical record is not encouraging.
Professor Kittrie asserts that "[a]n examination of international ter-
rorist movements indicates a common striving towards legitimacy."' But,
it is a legitimation based upon the ancient adage of might makes right.
7 Kittrie, Reconciling the Irreconcilable: The Quest for International Agreement over
Political Crime and Terrorism, [1978] Y.B. WORLD AFF. 208, 231-32.
1s C. LANDAUER, GERMANY: ILLUSIONS AND DILEMMAS 14 (1969).
19 Sohn, Comment, Panel entitled: Radical Perceptions of International Law and
Practice, 66 PROC. AMER. SOC. INT'L L. 162, 173 (1972). See also R. EMERSON, FROM EMPIRE
TO NATION: THE RISE TO SELF-ASSERTION OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN PEOPLES 307-08 (1969).
20 Kittrie, supra note 17, at 236.
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Conversely, historian Hans Kohn, a lifelong student of nationalism, be-
lieved that the U.N. Charter merely emphasized self-government and not
national independence.21 Legalist Jordan Paust, a much published con-
temporary scholar, recently equated self-determination with "equality of
opportunity for full and free participation by all persons within a given
society. '2 2 How does one, then, explain the startling disparity in these
opposing views? Why did the nexus between self-determination and pop-
ular sovereignty-so clearly discernible in the 18th century Age of Demo-
cratic Revolution-become twisted into the 20th century syndrome of ter-
rorist-liberation?
Political philosopher Michael Walzer has described the notion that
one can simply proclaim a litany of rights through the use of armed
force.22 This does not mean, however, that the overthrow of a government
previously established by law is in itself illegitimate. Nor does it mean
that states, recognized as legitimate in the international arena, may in
fact be illegitimate in their use, abuse, and perpetuation of power over
their helpless and hapless citizenry. Rebellion and revolution are recog-
nized remedies in international law, provided that the modalities of revolt
are not violative of established norms. What has confused and con-
founded contemporary international practice is the refusal of those who
claim the human right of self-determination to respect the human rights
of innocent parties in the ensuing struggle for national liberation. As we
have all too often witnessed in our own generation, those who profess to
fight tyrrany have themselves assumed the role of tyrants.
Bernard Lewis, a widely-respected historian and Islamicist, cogently
observed a few years ago that the reason why the United Nations has
been more or less impotent to develop measures to combat international
terrorism is that many of the governments represented in the United Na-
tions originally established their authority through the use of terror-vio-
lence. 24 It is for this reason that wars of national liberation have been
granted the juridical status of just wars by the majority of the world com-
munity. A 1962 conference of Afro-Asian jurist held in Conakry, Guinea,
provided the most concise expression of the Third World, Fourth World,
and Soviet Bloc liberation thesis: "All struggles undertaken by the peo-
, H. KOHN, REFLECTIONS ON MODERN HISTORY 336 (1963). See also G.
SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 67 (4th ed. 1960).
" Paust, The Concept of Norm: Toward a Better Understanding of Content, Author-
ity, and Constitutional Choice, 53 TEMPLE L.Q. 226, 285 (1980).
23 Walzer, The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics, 9 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFS. 209, 224-28 (1980).
U Lewis, The Palestinians and the PLO: A Historical Approach, COMMENTARY, Jan.
1975, at 48. The ineffectiveness and immobilization of the U.N. is described in detail by E.
Mickolus, Combatting International Terrorism: A Quantitative Analysis (1980) (unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation in Yale University Library).
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pies for their full national independence or for the restitution of their
territories or occupied parts thereof, including armed struggle, are en-
tirely legal."' 5
Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan has entitled the memoirs of his
U.N. ambassadorship "A Dangerous Place." A major theme of his biting
recollections is the diminution and deterioration of the rule of law in the
world community, along with the oppressive domination of that body by
an anti-democratic majority.2 His admonition to the U.N. Security Coun-
cil on January 10, 1976, remains as relevant today as when it was origi-
nally delivered: "self-determination is a democratic idea. It is an idea
based on law, on procedure, on consent . "...27
Perversion of the self-determination concept is not a new historical
phenomenon. Self-determinative claims of right were utilized by Adolf
Hitler as a legal justification for his expansionist and annexationist poli-
cies in the 1930's. As noted by historian Alfred Cobban, "[t]he appeal to
this principle was particularly effective for propaganda directed towards
the Western democracies, who could not forget it was supposed to be
their own principle in international affairs."2" A similar guilt complex was
developed by the Western democracies over the so-called settler regimes
(a Third World term of art) in Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), South Africa
and Israel. Nevertheless, in the latter two countries, to paraphrase former
French President Giscard d'Estaing, it is not a question of right and
wrong, but rather a more complicated issue of two conflicing sets of
rights.2 The Boers were in some regions of South Africa before any Afri-
can tribes had settled there, and the decade-long furor over Palestinian
rights in the United Nations has tended to undermine if not extinguish
Israel's right to exist-an existence which was brought into being by the
United Nations invocation of the self-determination process.
No one can deny the challenge so clearly stated by political scientist
Rupert Emerson: "Self-determination when self-exercised involves
revolution."30 It is likewise impossible to ignore the constraints and con-
trols that international law places upon internal events when they involve
external relationships. Historic, traditional international law was not
extinguished by the U.N. Charter, nor does the rejection by the Third
25 Quoted in W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 142 (1977); U. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 80-81
(1972). The conference date is cited incorrectly in the latter text.
,6 D. MOYNIHAN, A DANGEROUS PLACE (1980).
11 Id. at 303.
28 A. COBBAN, THE NATION STATE AND NATIONAL SELF-DETERMINATION 93 (rev. ed. 1970).
29 The N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1980, at 5, col. 1. These sentiments have also been echoed
by the new President of the European Community Commission, Gaston Thorn, See EUROPE,
Nov.-Dec., 1980, at 7.
30 R. EMERSON, supra note 19, at 398. See also Id. at 298-99.
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World, Fourth World, and Soviet World, of customary international
norms, as well as Western culture and tradition, mean that prior civilized
values and former legal standards no longer exist. States which establish
their own rules, and then apply them in an arbitrary and capricious fash-
ion, not only change the nature of the game, but also threaten the very
survival of the participants. To say that our law is not my law, but that
majority vote-however fundamentally unfair and violative of due pro-
cess-will determine any outcome, invariably substitutes the rule of the
jungle for the rule of law. Violence in whatever form is still violence, no
matter what rhetorical explications are propounded in world parliamen-
tary bodies, especially when those very organs are primarily dedicated to
the promotion and preservation of peace.
Self-determination is one thing; terror-violence is another. Refusal by
the United Nations to condemn such undeniable criminal acts, even when
allegedly committed in the name of a higher purpose, means that the
world community is either unwilling or unable to conform to the basic
human rights standards which have become a normative part of the inter-
national legal system during the past generation. The 1979-80 Committee
on Armed Conflict of the International Law Association, American
Branch, has clearly disavowed any doctrine or document which places
"purity of motives" above "humanitarian concerns."" Moreover, the posi-
tion of governments devoted to the rules of law and reason, and to those
fundamental values underlying any civilized society, must be addressed in
terms similar to ones enunciated by former Secretary of State William
Rogers when he appeared before the 1972 opening session of the U.N.
General Assembly: "[T]errorist acts are totally unacceptable attacks
against the very fabric of international order. They must be universally
condemned, whether we consider the cause the terrorists invoke noble or
ignoble, legitimate or illegitimate."'s2 In other words, to cite the venerable
legal maxim, jus ex injuria non oritur, or rights do not arise from wrongs.
The principle of self-determination first impacted upon the global
arena in this century through the medium of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen
Points." Wilson's striking eloquence promised more than he could de-
liver, and the ensuing bitterness over the peace settlements of the First
World War helped prepare the groundwork for a second world conflict.
Yet, self-determinative remedies were applied at Paris in 1919, and were
S Report of the Committee on Armed Conflict, PROC. AND COMM. REPORTS OF THE
AMER. BRANCH OF THE INT'L L. Assoc. 1979-1980, at 43.
82 67 DEP'T STATE BULL. 425, 429 (1972). See also declaration by the President of Vene-
zuela to the U.N. General Assembly on Nov. 16, 1976: "Violence which takes the form of
criminal action can never be a political act." Quoted by Venezuelan representative to Ad
Hoc Committee on Terrorism, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 160/3/Add. 2 (July 20, 1977), at 5.
" See generally, SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS
(ed. Y. Alexander & R. Friedlander 1980).
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again invoked by Wilson's disciple, Franklin Roosevelt, even before the
formal American entry into World War II. Both in 1919 and in 1945 self-
determination was a remedy to be implemented by state practice. Not
until the sovereignty explosion of the 1960's following the General Assem-
bly Declaration On the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples (Resolution 1514, December 1960),' 4 did self-determination
shift to a self-help process to be implemented by dissident minorities
against either Western colonial or European settler regimes. Recognition
of an asserted right by the United Nations became highly politicized and
exceedingly selective, causing several eminent Continental legal scholars,
such as Professor Charles de Visscher, to label self-determination as an
inherently suspect concept: "In its present total lack of precision it in no
way represents a principle of law. Applied without discernment, self-
determination would lead to anarchy." 5
Public international law has now reached a critical juncture. One way
points toward a civilized, normative system based upon equity, justice,
and the rule of reason. The other direction leads to a Spencerian environ-
ment of crises, conflict, and survival of the fittest. Which of the two will
ultimately prevail depends in part upon the sanctity of international
agreements and the humanity of organized society. As Judge Manley
Hudson wrote more than thirty years ago, at the end of his distinguished
career:
If Governments cannot have confidence that the instruments by
which they bind themselves will not be made to serve unintended pur-
poses, if respect is not paid to the terms and tenor of the obligations
imposed by such instruments, the result may be a reluctance to assume
further commitments and the progressive development of international
law may be seriously retarded. 0
To ignore this warning is to invite disastrous consequences for ourselves
and for the future of humankind.
" G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 66, U.N. Doc. A/4686 (1960).
"6 C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (P. Corbett
trans., rev. ed. 1968).
" Hudson, Integrity of International Instruments, 42 AM. J. INT'L L. 105, 108 (1948).

